5.5.2 Ελίτ και Ομάδες Πίεσης

Βιβλιογραφία

Aristotle (1932) Politics, Translated by Rackham H., Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Acemoglu D., Naidu S., Restrepo P., Robinson J.A. (2013) Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality, NBER Working Paper No. 19746.

Acemoglu D., Naidu S., Restrepo P., Robinson J.A. (2014) Democracy Does Cause Growth, NBER Working Paper No. 20004.

Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A. (2000) Why did the west extend the franchise?, Q. J. Econ. 115, 1167–1199.

Barro R.J. (1996) Democracy and growth, Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), pp. 1-27.

Barro R.J. (1997) Getting it Right: Markets and Choices in a Free Society, The MIT Press.

Barro R.J. (1999) Determinants of democracy, Journal of Political Economy, 107(S6): 158-183.

Bischoff I. (2003) Determinants of the increase in the number of interest groups in western democracies: theoretical considerations and evidence from 21 OECD countries, Public Choice, 114, pp. 197-218.

Borner S., Brunetti A., Weder B. (1995) Political Credibility and Economic Development, Macmillan Press: New York.

Coates D., Heckelman J.C. (2003) Interest groups and investment: A further test of the Olson hypothesis, Public Choice, 117, pp. 333-340.

Coates D., Heckelman J.C., Wilson B. (2007) Determinants of interest group formation, Public Choice, 133, pp. 377-391.

Coates D., Heckelman J.C., Wilson B. (2008) Democracy and volatility: Do special-interest groups matter?, Working Paper No.1, Department of Economics, John Cook School of Business, Saint Louis University.

DiCaprio A. (2012) Introduction: The Role of Elites in Economic Development, in Amsden A.H., DiCaprio A., Robinson J.A. (Eds.), The Role of Elites in Economic Development, Oxford University Press.

Gil R., Mulligan C.B., Sala-i-Martin X. (2004) Do democracies have different public policies than nondemocracies? J. Econ. Perspect. 18, 51–74.

Gradstein M., Milanovic B. (2004) Does liberte´Όe´galite´? A survey of the empirical evidence on the links between political democracy and income inequality, J. Econ. Surv., 18 (4), 515–537

Heckelman J.C. (2000) Consistent estimates of the impact of special interest groups on economic growth, Public Choice, 104, pp. 319-327.

Lindert P.H. (1994) The rise of social spending 1880–1930, Explor. Econ. Hist., 31 (1), 1–37.

Lipset S.M. (1959) Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, Issue 1: 69-105.

Murell P. (1984) An examination of the factors affecting the formation of interest groups in OECD countries, Public Choice, 43, pp. 151-171.

Olson M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard Economic Studies, Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Olson M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic growth, Stagflation and social rigidities, Yale university.

Papaioannou E., Siourounis G. (2008) Democratization and Growth, available at: http://econ.uop.gr/~econ/RePEc/pdf/MS2005647democ_and_growth.pdf.

Perotti R. (1996) Growth, income distribution and democracy: what the data say, J. Econ. Growth 1, 149–187.

Quinn D., Wooley J. (2001) Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability, American Journal of Political Science, 45, 634-657.

Rodrik D. (1999) Democracies pay higher wages, Q. J. Econ. 114, 707–738.

Rodrik D. (2000) Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What they are and how to Acquire them, Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(3), pp. 3-31.

Scheve K., Stasavage D. (2009) Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run, World Polit, 61, 215–253.

Scheve K., Stasavage D. (2010) The conscription of wealth: mass warfare and the demand for progressive taxation, Inter. Organ. 64, 529–561.

Scheve K., Stasavage D. (2012) Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation, Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 106 (1), 82–102.

Sirowy L., Inkeles A. (1990) The effects of democracy on economic growth and inequality: a review, Stud. Comput. Inter. Develop., 25, 126–157.

Tavares J., Wacziarg R. (2001) How democracy affects growth, European Economic Review 45, 1341}1378.

Μαυρογορδάτος Γ. (2000) Ομάδες Πίεσης και Δημοκρατία, Εκδόσεις Πατάκη, Αθήνα.

 

Further Reading List

Acemoglu D., Robinson J. (2008) Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions James, American Economic Review, 98:1, 267–293, available at: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.1.267.

Arnold J., Jalles J. (2014) Dividing the Pie in Brazil: Income Distribution, Social Policies and the New Middle Class, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1105, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzb6w1rt99p-en.

Becker G.S. (1981) A theory of political behavior, Part I: Pressure Groups, Center for the study of the economy and the state.

Brezis S.E., Crouzet F. (2004) The Role of Higher Education Institutions: Recruitment of Elites and Economic Growth, Working Paper No. 1360 Category 5: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth, CESIFO.

Brezis E.S., Temin P. (2013) Chapter 1 Elites, Minorities and Economic Growth in an Interdisciplinary Percpective.

Cavallo E., Scartascini C. (2012) Interest groups and government capabilities matter for financial development, VoxEU.

Gilens M., Page B.I. (2014) Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, Perspectives on Politics, doi:10.1017/S1537592714001595.

Les L. (2011) Five Ways that Financial Elites are Destroying Democracy, AlterNet.

López R., Islam A. (2008) When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections, WP 08-13, The University of Maryland.

Pausch M. (2014) Democratization and elitism in the EU: two opposing trends, Eur J Futures Res, 2: 56, doi:10.1007/s40309-014-0056-3.

Pritchet L., Werker E. (2012) Developing the guts of a GUT (Grand Unified Theory): elite commitment and inclusive growth, Working Paper Series 16/12, ESID.

Rodrik D. (2014) When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 28, no. 1, (pp. 189-208).