15.5 Θεωρίες Συμβολαιοποίησης, Κόστος Αντιπροσώπευσης, Δυσμενής Επιλογή, Ηθικός Κίνδυνος και Σηματοδότηση

Βιβλιογραφία

Akerlof G.A. (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (3): 488-500.

Arrow K.J. (1963) Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, The American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 941-973.

Erdem T., Swait J. (1998) Brand Equity as a Signaling Phenomenon, Journal of Consumer Psychology, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 131–157.

Holmström B. (1979) Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91.

North D. (1971) Institutional Change and Economic Growth, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 31, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History, pp. 118-125.

Williamson O.E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press.

Williamson O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting, Free Press: New York.

Williamson O.E. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, New York.

 

Further Reading List

Grossman S.J., Hart O.D. (1983) Implicit contract under asymmetry of information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98

Prescott E.C., Townsend R.M. (1984) Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard, Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 21-46.

Ravi K., Jukka P., Tuomala M. (2004) Moral Hazard, Income Taxation, and Prospect Theory, Working Papers 127136.

Tirole J. (1999) Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica, 67 (4), pp. 741-781.